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Abstract 
Many previous  experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the 
name of the game and the labeling of strategies. Usually these studies cannot tell whether frames 
affect preferences or beliefs. In this Dictator game study, we investigate whether social framing 
effects are also present when only one of the subjects makes a decision, in which case the frame 
may only affect preferences. We find that behavior is insensitive to social framing.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The power of economic theory derives partly from its parsimonious description of human 
motivation. Relying on the assumption that people’s preferences are stable, an approach most 
stoutly defended by Becker and Stigler (1977), economists have built a simple, coherent, and 
general model of human behavior.  
But critics argue that the simplicity and coherence has come at a high price: Preference 
stability is just too unrealistic an assumption. Social framing effects are considered to furnish a 
particularly striking example of unstable preferences. A large number of experiments document 
that behavior in elementary social settings, such as the Prisoners’ dilemma, depends on details 
such as the name that the experimenters have given to the game, or the labeling of the strategies. 
For example, subjects cooperate more when the situation is called the Community Game than 
when it is called the Wall Street Game (Liberman, Samuels, and Ross, 2004; Kay and Ross, 
2003).
1  
If preferences are so delicately sensitive to context, the external validity of preference data 
in general, and experimental data in particular, is gravely in doubt (see, e.g., Levitt and List, 
2007, and references therein).  In view of social framing effects, it has  been argued that 
conventional decision theory must be complemented by radically different approaches, involving 
concepts such as “role theory” (Montgomery, 1998), “team reasoning” (Bacharach 1993, 1999; 
Sugden, 1993), and “the logic of appropriateness” (March, 1994; Weber et al, 2004). That is, if 
preferences are to be viewed as stable at all, they must be much richer than Becker and Stigler 
envisaged. 
However, as noted  by Fehr and Schmidt (2006)  and Rabin (1998) among others, the 
presence of social framing effects does not prove that preferences are sensitive to context. The 
experimental evidence is also consistent with the alternative explanation that social context 
                                                       
1 See also Andreoni (1995), Brewer and Kramer (1986), Cookson (2000), Ellingsen et al (2011), McDaniel and 
Sistrunk (1991), McCusker and Carnevale (1995), Pillutla and Chen (1999), Sell and Son (1997), Sonnemans,  
Schram, and Offerman (1998), van Dijk and Wilke (2000), and Zhong, Loewenstein, and Murnighan (2007). There 
are also some studies that fail to find the expected social framing effects, notably Brandts and Schwieren (2009), 
Cubitt, Drouvelis, and Gächter (2011), Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt (2011), and Rege and Telle 
(2004). However, in Rege and Telle (2004) the effect size is large, so the lack of statistical significance might be due 
to a small sample, and Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt (2011) have inadvertently, but instructively, used 
ambiguous social frames. Most of the above works consider relatively “light” social framing, i.e., manipulations of 
labels only. The earliest studies, by Deutsch (1958, 1960), apply “heavy” social framing, with more outspoken 
demands on behavior.   2 
serves as a coordination device – entering subjects’ beliefs rather than their preferences.
2 Indeed, 
after  finding that social framing effects disappear when the Prisoners’ dilemma is played 
sequentially, Ellingsen et al (2011) suggest that social framing effects in the Prisoners’ dilemma 
work primarily through beliefs.
3 
In this paper, we investigate the preference channel more directly, by varying the social 
frame in a Dictator game. As the recipient has no move, we know that any effect on dictator 
behavior must come through the dictator’s preferences.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previously published study of social framing 
effects in Dictator games.
4  But several  researchers  have thought about the idea, and the 
conventional wisdom is that behavior will respond significantly.
5 For example, discussing the 
pros and cons of “neutrally” framed experiments, Loewenstein (1999, p.F31) writes: 
 
[i]t  would be easy, through a suitable manipulation of context, to 
design a dictator study in which people would give none of their 
                                                       
2 If people care only about the own material payoff, beliefs should play no role in a Prisoners’ dilemma. However, 
various common forms of altruism and reciprocity suffice to map a material Prisoners’ dilemma into a game with 
multiple equilibria; see Ellingsen et al (2011) for formalities. 
3 Relatedly, Cubitt, Drouvelis, and Gächter (2011) study the impact of framing on punishment and emotions in a 
one-shot social dilemma with and without punishment. They find no evidence that the frame affects punishment 
behavior or emotions, leading them to conclude that social preferences are relatively stable. However, the framing 
effect on initial contributions is also insignificant in their study. 
4 In the concluding section, we discuss the closely related unpublished study by Suvoy (2003), which was recently 
brought to our attention by Sujoy Chakravarty. There we also discuss the findings of Leliveld, van Dijk, and van 
Beest (2008) concerning framing effects in Ultimatum games. For completeness, let us here also mention one 
additional related study. Keysar et al (2008) ostensibly let pairs of subjects play a sequence of two Dictator games, 
with some pairs acting under a “give” frame and other pairs under a “take” frame. Leaving aside the problem that an 
even allocation of the money can be attained after any decision by the first mover, the experiment must be 
interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, only one participant is being paid. Thus, at most one of the 
subjects in a pair will be playing with real money. When the first mover chooses an even split rather than to keep all 
the money, this could thus be seen as an implicit suggestion of mutual insurance. Due to risk aversion, both players 
getting 50 is preferable to both players having an even chance of 100 and 0. Second, the experiment involves severe 
deception: In fact, there is no first mover. All subjects are second movers, being led to believe that the first mover 
chose an even split. Apparently many of the participants anticipated being deceived, as data for ten of the fifty 
participants in the relevant experiment were excluded because these participants didn’t believe that there was a 
second mover. Clearly, the study violates the norm against deception that is currently enforced in economics. That 
objection aside, as subjects were clearly suspicious that they were being deceived, their behavior is difficult to 
interpret. 
5 Besides the evidence that social frames matter in multi-person games, there is evidence that other sorts of frames 
can matter in single-person decision problems. For example, in a seminal study, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
showed that people’s ranking of lotteries depend on whether outcomes are framed as gains or losses. For a survey of 
individual choice effects of wording, see Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998). For a suggestion how to take account 
of framing effects in decision theory, see Salant and Rubinstein (2008).   3 
money to a stranger, or one in which most people would give all of 
their money away. 
 
Likewise, Fehr and Schmidt (2006, p.659) argue: 
 
While the experimental results on ultimatum games are fairly robust, 
the dictator game seems to be a rather fragile situation in which minor 
factors can have large effects. 
 
At the outset, these were our priors too. 
We conduct two studies. In the first study, we let dictators either move money from their 
“own” envelope (give) or move money from the “other’s” envelope (take). The dictator is 
completely anonymous to the recipient as well as to the experimenter, but in one pair of 
treatments the recipient learns about the game whereas in the other treatment the recipient does 
not learn at all where the money, if any, comes from. We hypothesized that the dictator would be 
relatively averse to taking, as this could be seen as violating the other’s entitlement, and that the 
recipient would thus get more money in the take treatment, especially when recipients learn 
about what has happened. Although there are tendencies in the hypothesized direction, effect 
sizes are economically tiny and statistically insignificant. 
The second study  is designed with two objectives in mind. First, we seek to remove 
confounds that may cloud inference in the first study. For example, the label “taking game” may 
to some subjects have justified violating the other’s entitlement. Therefore, in the second study 
we only manipulate the name of the game and the strategy labels, not the entitlement. In the 
lightest pair of frames, one game is called the Giving Game and the other is called the Keeping 
Game, but actions are given a neutral label,  “transfer”. In the heavier pair of frames, the 
corresponding  actions are called “give” and “keep” respectively. Second, we desire  a large 
enough sample size to ensure that any economically significant difference is also statistically 
significant. To collect such a large sample, we use the online labor market Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, henceforth MTurk,  to  conduct the  experiment electronically (For a description and 
discussion of MTurk, we refer to Horton et al., In press.) However, even with about 200 subjects 
per treatment, social framing effects are so small as to remain statistically insignificant.   4 
As MTurk is a new technology for performing economic experiments, one might wonder 
whether if the lack of significant effects in Study 2 is the result of some limitation of the MTurk 
platform. To demonstrate that this is not the case, and that MTurk experiments are able to detect 
framing effects where they do exist, we perform a replication experiment, described in Appendix 
A. Consistent with previous results in the physical lab (Liberman, Samuels, and Ross, 2004; Kay 
and Ross, 2003), we find that in a one-shot Prisoners’ dilemma on MTurk, calling the game the 
‘Community Game’ results in significantly more cooperation than when the game is called the 
‘Profit Game.’ 
Our conclusion is that preferences in Dictator games, at least in our subject pools, are 
largely immune to mere labeling of games and strategies. The finding supports the hypothesis 
that social frames primarily affect behavior through beliefs rather than preferences.  
 
2. THEORY 
Before discussing social framing effects, it is useful to consider which model best explains 
the wealth of existing Dictator game data.
6 We shall not here attempt a complete survey of the 
various approaches to modeling  social preferences; see  Camerer (2003),  Fehr and Schmidt 
(2006), and Sobel (2005) for surveys, and Andreoni and Miller (2002) for an empirical study that 
links up with conventional choice theory.
7 But it is noteworthy that several recent proposals 
revolve around the hypothesis that societies have norms governing the sharing of joint windfalls, 
and that people trade-off their material benefit against compliance with the social norm; see in 
particular Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), Konow (2010), and Krupka and Weber (2010).
8 To 
the extent that norm compliance is observable, it is now also quite clear that people factor their 
social esteem or image into the decision.  
As Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) show, in somewhat different notation, the following 
utility function captures many of the observed Dictator game regularities: 
                                                       
6 At the time of writing, the literature on Dictator games comprises more than 120 published articles; see Engel 
(2011) for a recent survey. 
7 Recall that Becker and Stigler (1977), while defending preference stability, never insisted that people ought to be 
seen as selfish materialists. To the contrary, throughout his career, Gary Becker has been a leading advocate of 
social preferences. His models are populated with agents having tastes for (out-group) discrimination as well as (in-
group) altruism. See, e.g., Becker (1974). 
8 It is quite clear that people are more prone to share windfalls than earned money (e.g., Cherry, Frykblom and 
Shogren, 2002), and it is likely that this is due to social norms that distinguish the two situations (Cappelen et al, 
2007).   5 
 
Ui = u(1-s,m) + ηiv(s-1/2),  (1) 
 
where s is the share of the windfall that is given to the recipient, ½ is the social norm (the ideal 
gift) concerning how to split a windfall gain, ηi is a parameter that indexes how strongly a 
dictator of type i cares about complying with the norm, and m is the dictator’s social image – 
which is given by (the dictators belief about) the recipient’s belief about η, conditionally on the 
dictator’s choice of s. The sub-utility functions u and v are assumed to be concave in (1-s) and s 
respectively, but while u is everywhere increasing in both arguments, v attains a maximum at 
s=1/2.Heterogeneity in behavior is here explained by the assumption that people differ in their 
norm-compliance parameter η. 
Due to the concern for social image, m, Andreoni and Bernheim’s utility function implies 
that the Dictator game is essentially a signaling game, and in order to make precise predictions 
about behavior one must significantly refine the set of  Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under 
appropriate refinements, such as D1, the actual distribution of η in the population is relatively 
unimportant for the qualitative results. Instead, the key is that a larger η only induces larger gifts 
s up to the point that s=1/2. Thus, even if the social image concern is strong, people stop giving 
at that point. In this way, the model explains the large frequency of equal splits without assuming 
that the utility function has a kink at this point. The model also explains the very low frequency 
of gifts just below 1/2 and just above 0. 
Since people are concerned about their social esteem, the model can furthermore explain 
why the degree of dictator anonymity matters (Hoffman et al, 1994). Likewise, the model 
explains why people are willing to pay for quietly exiting the Dictator game rather than going 
through with their initial allocation, as documented by Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006); see also 
Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson (2007) and Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2010). As 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) show, people are also more prone to give small amounts when 
the recipient is informed that small gift could have come about by chance – due to circumstances 
beyond their control; see also Tadelis (2008). Plainly, the loss of esteem is smaller when the 
recipient cannot infer from a small gift that the dictator is selfish. 
In addition to the above evidence, which Andreoni and Bernheim themselves explicitly 
address, we would like to add that their model is also capable of explaining the findings by   6 
Bardsley (2008) and List (2007), who both show that the introduction of additional “taking” 
options for the dictator reduces giving. Even if the ideal behavior s=1/2 is the same, the greediest 
option now involves taking, which means that a smaller gift suffices to separate oneself from the 
most selfish types. As far as we know, this point has not been made before.
9 
We do not want to claim that the model embodied in equation (1) can capture all the 
available Dictator game evidence. First, it seems likely that social distance between the dictator 
and the recipient also matters significantly. Bohnet and Frey (1999) find that dictators give more 
when they can see the recipient; similarly Charness and Gneezy (2008) show that gifts go up 
when the dictator learns the recipient’s surname. Reductions in social distance may also explain 
why pre-play and anticipated post-play messages by the recipient serve to increase giving 
(Andreoni, 2011; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008b; Houser and Xiao, 2010; Mohlin and 
Johannesson, 2008). Similarly, dictators who are exposed to other dictators’ decisions or to 
recipient expectations tend to give more on average, even for a given level of anonymity 
(Biccieri and Xiao, 2009; Ellingsen et al, 2010; Krupka and Weber, 2009).
10 While some of 
these findings could be due to actual transmission of information about norms and about other 
people’s feelings, a direct  effect of social distance better fits the sum of the evidence. 
Nonetheless, it seems to us that “social distance” is a concept that is both more specific and 
tractable than “social frame,” and thus represents less of a challenge for decision theory. We 
therefore leave it aside here. 
That said, at an abstract level it is easy enough to introduce social framing effects in the 
above model. Simply multiply the second term by a parameter φ
F, denoting the congruence 
between the frame F and the social norm. Then, the utility function becomes 
 
Ui = u(1-s,m) + φ
Fηiv(s-1/2).  (2) 
 
For example, if the equal division norm is expected to be more salient under a Giving 
frame than under a Keeping frame, the distribution of gifts should move upwards in the former 
                                                       
9 Another possibility is that the ideal point changes for some subjects, who think that the norm prescribes an equal 
split of whatever surplus they have the power to distribute. 
10 There are also several studies suggesting that subtle primes, such as pictures of eyes or a few dots arranged like a 
face on the computer screen, affect behavior in Dictator games (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Rigdon et al, 2009). One 
interpretation is that these cues subconsciously enhance concerns for social esteem or decrease the felt social 
distance.   7 
case. Thus, while it seems hard to develop a general model that includes social framing effects 
(because it requires a metric that relates frames to each other), it is straightforward to merely 
measure the magnitude of such an effect in an experiment where the frames, as well as other 
features, are tightly controlled. Indeed, as the effect is expected to be monotonic across dictator 
types in our experiment, we may merely compare the mean gifts under the two frames. 
 
3. THE FIRST STUDY 
 
We recruited 400 subjects from public spaces around Harvard University in June 2008 to 
play a one-shot Dictator game. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to be dictators, and 
the other half to be recipients. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of two different rooms, 
which ahead of time had been randomized to the different treatments. All subjects in the same 
room were in the same role (dictators or recipients), and all subjects in a room were in the same 
treatment. All subjects were paid a show-up fee of $5. The study took approximately 10 minutes. 
In our 2X2 design, the game is (i) framed either in terms of giving or taking, and (ii) 
recipients are either uninformed or informed about the game.
11In each of the four treatments, 
dictators make a choice about how to divide $10 between themselves and another anonymous 
subject (the recipient).  
We frame the game in the following way. Every dictator receives two numbered envelopes 
and a set of written instructions. One of the envelopes is marked “You” and the other is marked 
“Other person”. In the giving game, the “You” envelope contains 10 $1 bills and the other 
envelope is empty, whereas in the taking game the “You” envelope is empty while the “Other 
person” envelope contains 10 $1 bills. In the instructions, subjects are informed that they will 
play either the “Giving game” or the “Taking game,” and that they will decide how many bills to 
“give to” or “take from” the recipient. In both the giving game and the taking game, dictators go 
behind a screen one at a time, and move as much money from one envelope to the other as they 
wish. Once a dictator reaches a decision, he/she puts the “Other person” envelope in a box 
marked “Mail,” and keeps  the  “You”  envelope. Dictators then fill out a questionnaire  on 
                                                       
11 When Koch and Norman (2008) manipulate recipient awareness of the game, there is a tendency for gifts to 
become smaller when the recipient gets the money but is unaware of the game being played, but the effect is 
statistically insignificant.   8 
demographics, put it in a box marked “Questionnaire” and leave. Thus the framing is done via 
both the name of the game and the labeling of the allocation action. 
In order to detect any role of esteem concerns, we let recipients be either uninformed or 
informed about the existence of a game. When uninformed, they do not know they are recipients 
in a Dictator game. When informed, they are given the same instructions as the dictators in their 
treatment. By having all recipients, uninformed and informed, fill out a questionnaire on an 
unrelated topic, uninformed recipients believe they are receiving money for completion of this 
questionnaire  (note that we do not deceive the subjects,  since all recipients fill out this 
questionnaire and we do not explicitly tell the recipients that they receive money for completion 
of the questionnaire). Dictators know whether their recipient is uninformed or informed, but are 
unaware of the existence of any of the treatments other than the one they are participating in. 
When all dictators in a session had made their decisions, the experimenters took the box 
marked mail to another room, and recorded the content of each envelope without removing any 
bills from the envelope. The experimenters  then took  the envelopes to the room with the 




The average transfer is very similar across the four treatments (Figure 1). To test foran 
effect of how the game is framed (giving versus taking), for an effect of recipient information 
about the payoff structure (uninformed versus informed), and for an interaction between the two, 
we perform six regression analyses. All analyses use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
with robust standard errors,
12 taking percentage transferred as the dependent variable (0 to 100), 
and including controls for gender and age (Tables 1 and 2).
13 
First we test the effect of the framing of the game. We begin by examining the case when 
the recipient is uninformed, comparing the Giving-Uninformed and Taking-Uninformed 
treatments. We find no significant effect of a ‘Taking’ dummy (coeff = -0.51, p = 0.923). Next 
we test the effect of the framing of the game when the recipient is informed, comparing the 
Giving-Informed and Taking-Informed treatments. We again find no significant effect of a 
                                                       
12 Instead using Tobit regression with robust standard errors, to account for the minimum (0) and maximum (100) 
transfer percentages, gives qualitatively equivalent results. We choose to report OLS results so as to have directly 
interpretable coefficients. 
13 We consistently find a significant positive effect of female gender on dictator transfer.   9 
‘Taking’ dummy (coeff = -3.56, p = 0.504). Finally, we test the effect of framing the game while 
pooling over both recipient information conditions. Yet again, we find no significant effect of a 
‘Taking’ dummy (coeff = -3.2, p = 0.370). 
Second we test the effect of informing the recipient. We begin by examining the giving 
game, comparing Giving-Uninformed and Giving-Informed. We find no significant effect of an 
‘Informed’ dummy (coeff = 6.73, p = 0.211). Next we test the effect of informing the recipient in 
the taking game, comparing Taking-Uninformed and Taking-Informed. We again find no 
significant effect of an ‘Informed’ dummy (coeff = 2.43, p = 0.651). Finally, we test the effect of 
informing the recipient, pooling over both frames. Yet again, we find no significant effect of an 
‘Informed’ dummy (coeff = 4.15, p = 0.253). 
In sum, we find no significant effect of either how the game is framed or whether the 
recipient is informed of the payoff structure.  
 
4. THE SECOND STUDY 
 
A possible objection to the first study is that the “taking” label is ambiguous. Perhaps some 
subjects interpret the label as a license to take rather than a reminder of the immorality of 
moving money from the other’s envelope? In that case, the unselfishness induced by putting 
money in the “other” envelope will be counteracted, rather than magnified, by the taking label.  
In the second study, we therefore return to a more standard set-up. The endowment always 
originally belongs to the dictator, and the names of the game and the strategies are chosen to 
have perfectly unambiguous normative implications: The Giving Game is contrasted with the 
Keeping Game. 
We recruited 1586 subjects from MTurk in March and April 2010 to play a modified one-
shot dictator game. 793 subjects were randomly allocated to be dictators and 793 to be recipients. 
Subjects were randomly allocated to be either dictator or recipient in one of four different 
treatments. All subjects were paid a show-up fee of 20 cents. The study took on average 3 
minutes to complete.
14 
                                                       
14Online labor markets in general, and MTurk in particular, have recently received considerable attention as 
powerful platforms for performing incentive-compatible experiments. On MTurk, employers hire workers from 
around the world to complete short tasks for small amounts of money (usually less than $1). This allows researchers 
to recruit large number of subjects quickly with little effort or expense. Stakes are generally much lower in MTurk 
experiments than in physical lab experiments, a feature that is partly justified by the much smaller time costs   10 
In our 2X2 design, (i) the game is framed either in terms of giving or keeping, and (ii) the 
action label is either neutral or active. In all four treatments, dictators receive 100 cents and 
choose how to allocate those 100 cents between themselves and another anonymous subject (the 
recipient). 
We frame the game by informing subjects, in the written instructions, that they are playing 
either “the giving game” or “the keeping game”.  
The action label is either neutral (“Transfer”) or active (“Give” in the giving game and 
“Keep” in the keeping game). In the treatments with the neutral action label (Giving-Transfer 
and Keeping-Transfer) and the ‘Give’ action label (Giving-Give), dictators use a sliding bar to 
indicate the number of cents (out of 100) they want to recipient to receive. In the treatment with 
the ‘Keep’ action label (Keeping-Keep) dictators instead indicate the number of cents they want 
to receive themselves (again using a 0-to-100 sliding bar).  
Once a dictator has made her decision, she fills out a questionnaire on demographics. To 
explore the effect of framing on beliefs, recipients are asked to indicate how much of 100 cents 
they expect to receive from their dictator. Recipients then fill out the same questionnaire. In all 




We begin by considering dictator transfers. As in Study 1, the average transfer is very 
similar across the four treatments of Study 2 (Figure 2). To test for effects of the game name 
(giving versus keeping) and the action label (transfer versus give/keep), we use a regression 
analysis similar to that of Study 1. All analyses use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 
robust standard errors,
15 taking percentage transferred as the dependent variable, and including 
controls for gender, age and country of residence (Tables 3 and 4). 
First we test the effect of the framing of the game. We begin by examining the case when 
the action is labeled neutrally, comparing the Giving-Transfer and Keeping-Transfer treatments. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
associated with participating. Online experiments also necessarily permit less control over subjects during the study. 
To address these and other concerns regarding the validity of experiments run on MTurk, a number of replication 
studies have been undertaken (see Rand 2011 for an overview). Most relevant for the present study, quantitative 
agreement between behavior on MTurk and in the physical lab has been demonstrated in a one-shot prisoners’ 
dilemma (Horton et al., 2011) and a repeated 4-player public goods game (Suri and Watts, 2011); and it has been 
shown that subjects on MTurk respond to framing manipulations (Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al., 2011). 
15 As in Study 1, instead using Tobit regression gives qualitatively equivalent results.   11 
We find no significant effect of a ‘Keeping’ dummy (coeff = 0.84, p = 0.739). Next we test the 
effect of the game name when the action is also given a label with valence, comparing the 
Giving-Give and Keeping-Keep treatments. We again find no significant effect of a ‘Keeping’ 
dummy (coeff = -2.86, p = 0.696). Finally, we test the effect of game name while pooling over 
both action labeling conditions. Yet again, we find no significant effect of a ‘Keeping’ dummy 
(coeff = -0.67, p = 0.720). 
Second we test the effect of giving the action a neutral label (“Transfer”) versus an active 
label (“Give” or “Keep”). We begin by examining the giving game, comparing Giving-Transfer 
and Giving-Give. We find no significant effect of a ‘Transfer’ dummy (coeff = -1.41, p = 0.591). 
Next we test the effect of the action label in the keeping game, comparing Keeping-Transfer and 
Keeping-Keep. We again find no significant effect of a ‘Transfer’ dummy (coeff = 0.92, p = 0. 
738). Finally, we test the effect of neutral versus active label, pooling over both games. Yet 
again, we find no significant effect of a ‘Transfer’ dummy (coeff = -0.90, p = 0.630). 
Thus, as in Study 1, we find no significant framing effects. Neither the name of the game 
nor the action label significantly changes the average transfer. 
We finally turn to recipient beliefs about dictator transfers. Recipients are quite accurate in 
their predictions, and we find no significant difference between expected and actual transfers 
overall, or within each treatment (Rank-sum, p>0.10 for all comparisons)
16. Therefore, as can be 
seen in Figure 3, expected transfers also do not vary across treatments. We perform the same set 
of regressions used above to test for effects of game name and action label, and again find no 
significant effects (Tables 5 and 6). Thus we find no evidence that framing changed the beliefs of 
the recipients about how the dictators would behave. 
 
5. FINAL REMARKS 
 
As noted in the Introduction, there is a widespread concern that people’s conception of 
situations and the norms that govern them are easily malleable – that minor changes in how the 
situation is described can affect people’s preferences.  However, our experimental evidence 
rejects the hypothesis that behavior in a Dictator game is sensitive to the naming of the game or 
                                                       
16  The difference between expected and actual transfers remains non-significant when including only attentive 
subjects (Rank-sum, p>0.10 for all comparisons).   12 
of the strategies. If there is such an effect at all in our experiment, we have enough statistical 
power to say that it is small.  
After completing our work, we became aware of Suvoy (2003), an unpublished Honors 
thesis reporting evidence from an experiment quite similar to our first study – a dictator game 
framed as either a taking game or a giving game, with associated entitlements. Like us, Suvoy 
failed to identify any significant effect of the frame on behavior, rejecting his (and our) 
hypothesis that the dictator would be less greedy in the take frame. However, we think that our 
rejection is even stronger, since we expose each subject to one frame only; Suvoy let each 
subject make decisions under both frames. 
Our studies are also closely related to Leliveld, van Dijk, and van Beest (2008), who 
investigate framing effects on proposer behavior in the Ultimatum game. They consider three 
frames: “giving”, “splitting”, and “taking.” They find that the proposals are more generous in the 
“taking” treatment (the opponent has the entitlement) than in the “giving” treatment in (the 
proposer has the entitlement). These findings are perfectly in line with our initial expectations, 
and the effect sizes are considerable. Why, then, is it that there is a framing effect in this study 
but not in ours? One reason would be that responder can reject in the Ultimatum game, and that 
proposers anticipate more aggressive rejections under the taking frame. However, Leliveld, van 
Dijk, and van Beest (2008) apparently control carefully for this effect.  Another explanation is 
that procedures differ in the two studies. We are particularly concerned that subjects in a study 
conducted by psychologists are suspicious that they are being deceived or that payments are not 
real. (As it happens, Leliveld, van Dijk, and van Beest deceived their subjects, because they were 
not playing against another subject at all, and ultimate payments didn’t depend on their behavior, 
despite instructions to the contrary.) In this case, some subjects may simply decide to neglect the 
monetary incentives and instead behave either according to some moral norm or as they think 
that the experimenters desire.  A final explanation could be that Ultimatum game proposer 
behavior is in fact more sensitive to framing effects (“more fragile”) than Dictator behavior – 
quite contrary to the conventional wisdom.  
In light of currently available evidence, our own conclusion is that preferences are less 
sensitive to social framing effects than we previously thought, but that considerable uncertainty 
remains.   
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Figure 1. Average dictator game transfer in Study 1 (out of $10), by framing of 










Figure 2. Average dictator game transfer (out of 100 cents) in Study 2, by 
framing of the game (giving versus keeping) and labeling of the action 
(transfer versus give/keep). 
 








Figure 3.Average dictator game transfer expected by recipients (out of 100 
cents) in Study 2, by framing of the game (giving versus keeping) and labeling 
of the action (transfer versus give/keep). 
 










Taking-Informed  All data 
Taking Game  -2.400  -0.506  -3.400  -3.556  -2.900  -3.189 
   (5.129)  (5.243)  (5.046)  (5.297)  (3.593)  (3.545) 
Female     14.09***     1.940     7.878** 
      (5.337)     (5.255)     (3.723) 
Age     -0.0280     -0.140     -0.0921 
      (0.268)     (0.401)     (0.228) 
Constant  21.40***  14.46*  22.80*** 24.80**  20.90*** 19.04*** 
   (3.780)  (7.786)  (3.704)  (9.708)  (2.531)  (5.324) 




     
Observations  100  100  100  100  200  200 
R-squared  0.002  0.077  0.005  0.008  0.003  0.027 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






& Taking-Informed  All data 
Informed Recipient  4.800  6.729  3.800  2.432  4.300  4.152 
   (5.102)  (5.349)  (5.073)  (5.358)  (3.585)  (3.623) 
Female     5.786     10.55*     7.684** 
      (5.216)     (5.391)     (3.743) 
Age     0.308     -0.442**     -0.0691 
      (0.338)     (0.180)     (0.242) 
Constant  21.40***  10.91  22.80***  26.55***  24.50***  22.30*** 
   (3.780)  (8.758)  (3.704)  (6.759)  (2.516)  (5.288) 




     
Observations  100  100  100  100  200  200 
R-squared  0.009  0.034  0.006  0.061  0.007  0.030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2: The effect of recipient information on transfers in Study 1 
 






Keeping-Keep  All data 
Keeping Game  0.451  0.839  -2.52  -1.118  -0.912  -0.668 
   (2.341)  (2.519)  (2.648)  (2.862)  (1.752)  (1.863) 
Gender     -0.807     -0.627     -0.860 
      (2.677)     (3.088)     (1.998) 
Age     -0.0492     0.154     0.0464 
      (0.126)     (0.135)     (0.0905) 
Constant  36.89***  2.362  35.90***  29.29***  36.62***  97.33*** 
   (1.565)  (6.045)  (1.871)  (5.010)  (1.276)  (4.369) 
Country of residence 
dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 




     
Observations  430  429  363  361  793  790 
R-squared  0.000  0.133  0.003  0.083  0.000  0.085 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                






Keeping-Keep  All data 
Transfer Action  -1.53  -1.408  1.441  -0.924  -0.0407  -0.900 
   (2.441)  (2.615)  (2.556)  (2.758)  (1.762)  (1.866) 
Gender     -2.223     1.384     -0.916 
      (2.738)     (2.953)     (1.998) 
Age     0.200     -0.0544     0.0448 
      (0.130)     (0.128)     (0.0904) 
Constant  36.89***  91.38***  35.90***  52.04***  37.13***  98.97*** 
   (1.565)  (5.590)  (1.871)  (6.766)  (1.324)  (4.243) 
Country of 
residence 
dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 




     
Observations  418  416  375  374  793  790 
R-squared  0.001  0.129  0.001  0.132  0.000  0.085 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             









Keeping-Keep  All data 
Keeping Game  -1.613  0.124  0.669  1.445  -0.497  0.442 
   (2.491)  (2.505)  (2.745)  (2.875)  (1.848)  (1.841) 
Gender     2.583     -5.187*     -1.021 
      (2.694)     (3.019)     (1.947) 
Age     -0.00598     0.0869     0.0392 
      (0.104)     (0.143)     (0.0834) 
Constant  37.39***  27.76***  37.08***  44.40***  36.42***  46.17*** 
   (1.812)  (6.314)  (1.954)  (8.596)  (1.294)  (5.123) 
Country of residence 
dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 




     
Observations  409  409  390  390  799  799 
R-squared  0.001  0.194  0.000  0.168  0.000  0.159 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                






Keeping-Keep  All data 
Transfer Action  0.987  0.467  -1.295  -0.524  -0.142  -0.741 
   (2.646)  (2.784)  (2.596)  (2.579)  (1.852)  (1.834) 
Gender     -0.365     -2.268     -1.043 
      (2.870)     (2.913)     (1.946) 
Age     0.0909     0.115     0.0398 
      (0.147)     (0.122)     (0.0835) 
Constant  37.39***  43.20***  37.08***  5.273  36.74***  45.69*** 
   (1.812)  (8.924)  (1.954)  (4.467)  (1.371)  (4.845) 
Country of 
residence dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 




     
Observations  402  402  397  397  799  799 
R-squared  0.000  0.144  0.001  0.217  0.000  0.160 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
  Table 6: The effect of action label on recipient’s expected transfer   
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Appendix A – Framing in a one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma on MTurk 
 
To demonstrate the presence of framing effects on MTurk in games where both subjects 
make a decision, we recruited 400 subjects from MTurk in February 2011 to play a modified 
one-shot Prisoners’ dilemma game. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of two framing 
treatments. All subjects were paid a show-up fee of 25 cents. The study took on average 4 
minutes to complete. 
Subjects were informed that they were playing either the ‘Community game’ or the ‘Profit 
game’.
17 Then they read identical instructions for the following Prisoners’ dilemma, indicated 
their decision (A or B), and completed a post-experimental questionnaire. 
 
A               B 
A   $0.15, $0.15    $0, $0.20 
B     $0.20, $0           $0.05, $0.05 
 
Unlike in our Dictator game experiments, we do find substantial variation in Prisoners’ 
dilemma cooperation across treatments (Community game: 65% cooperation, Profit game: 58% 
cooperation).  To test for effects of the game name, we use logistic  regression with robust 
standard errors, taking decision to cooperate (i.e. choose option ‘A’) as the dependent variable, 
and including controls for gender, age and country of residence. We find a negative effect of the 
‘Profit game’ frame on cooperation (coeff = -0.446, p = 0.043; Table A1). 
Thus we show that framing effects do occur on MTurk in games where both players 
make a decision. This supports our conclusion that the lack of framing effects in our Dictator 
games is the result of the unilateral nature of the dictator game decision setting.   
                                                       
17 It has been previously demonstrated in the traditional (offline) laboratory that subjects cooperation more when the 
PD is called the ‘Community game’ relative to the ‘Wall Street game’ (Liberman et al. 2004). In this replication, we 
used the term ‘Profit game’ instead of ‘Wall Street game’ because of the particular negative valence attached to 
Wall Street in the mind of (at least) the American public at the time of the experiment.   26 
  
Community game vs  
Profit game 
Profit Game  -0.306  -0.446** 













Constant  0.626***  -18.53*** 
   (0.149)  (1.403) 
Country of residence 




Observations  400  378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 Table A1. The effect of game name in a Prisoner’s dilemma 
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Appendix B: Instructions for Study 1 
 
GIVING GAME: INSTRUCTIONS (“baseline”; the same instructions in room A and B)  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. You have all received a $5 show-up fee. You also have the 
opportunity to receive additional money as described below. 
 
Each of you will be paired with another person in another room based on your pair number. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are.  
 
You are in room A (B). Every person in room A and room B has received these same instructions.  
 
In this study we will play the giving game. 
 
The giving game works as follows. Every person in room A has been given two numbered envelopes 
together with these instructions (the number is written on the inside of the envelope, and is therefore 
invisible to others). One of these envelopes is marked “You” and contains ten $1 bills. The other envelope 
is marked “Other person” and is empty.  
 
The experimenter asks one person at a time in room A to go behind a screen where no one else can see 
what happens.    
 
Behind the screen, the person decides how many bills, if any, to give to the person in room B and puts 
these bills in the envelope marked “Other person”. The person in room A then pockets the envelope 
marked “You”.   
 
When the person behind the screen has made his/her decision he/she puts the envelope marked “Other 
person” in the box marked “Mail”. The person then proceeds to a second screen and anonymously fills 
out a questionnaire about the experiment. The person puts the completed questionnaire in the box marked 
“Questionnaire” and leaves the room. That person is now finished with the study. 
 
When all the people in Room A have made their decisions, the experimenter takes the box marked “Mail” 
to an adjacent room. The experimenter records the content of each envelope, without removing any bills 
from the envelopes.  
 
The experimenter then takes the envelopes to Room B, where the people have been filling out a 
questionnaire while they have been waiting for the envelopes to arrive. The experimenter distributes the 
envelopes to the people in room B according to the pair numbers on their instructions. The people in room 
B then leave their room and the study is over.     
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TAKING GAME: INSTRUCTIONS (“baseline”; the same instructions in room A and B)  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. You have all received a $5 show-up fee. You also have the 
opportunity to receive additional money as described below. 
 
Each of you will be paired with another person in another room based on your pair number. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are.  
 
You are in room A (B). Every person in room A and room B has received these same instructions.  
 
In this study we will play the taking game. 
 
The taking game works as follows. Every person in room A has been given two numbered envelopes 
together with these instructions (the number is written on the inside of the envelope, and is therefore 
invisible to others). One of these envelopes is marked “Other person” and contains ten $1 bills. The other 
envelope is marked “You” and is empty.  
 
The experimenter asks one person at a time in room A to go behind a screen where no one else can see 
what happens.    
 
Behind the screen, the person decides how many bills, if any, to take from the person in room B and puts 
these bills in the envelope marked “You”. The person in room A then pockets the envelope marked 
“You”.   
 
When the person behind the screen has made his/her decision he/she puts the envelope marked “Other 
person” in the box marked “Mail”. The person then proceeds to a second screen and anonymously fills 
out a questionnaire about the experiment. The person puts the completed questionnaire in the box marked 
“Questionnaire” and leaves the room. That person is now finished with the study. 
 
When all the people in Room A have made their decisions, the experimenter takes the box marked “Mail” 
to an adjacent room. The experimenter records the content of each envelope, without removing any bills 
from the envelopes.  
 
The experimenter then takes the envelopes to Room B, where the people have been filling out a 
questionnaire while they have been waiting for the envelopes to arrive. The experimenter distributes the 
envelopes to the people in room B according to the pair numbers on their instructions. The people in room 
B then leave their room and the study is over.     
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GIVING GAME: INSTRUCTIONS (“no information”; room A)  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. You have all received a $5 show-up fee. You also have the 
opportunity to receive additional money as described below. 
 
Each of you will be paired with another person in another room based on your pair number. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are.  
 
You are in room A. The people in room B have NOT received these same instructions. A copy of the 
instructions they have received is attached. 
 
In this study we will play the giving game. 
 
The giving game works as follows. Every person in room A has been given two numbered envelopes 
together with these instructions (the number is written on the inside of the envelope, and is therefore 
invisible to others). One of these envelopes is marked “You” and contains ten $1 bills. The other envelope 
is marked “Other person” and is empty.  
 
The experimenter asks one person at a time in room A to go behind a screen where no one else can see 
what happens.    
 
Behind the screen, the person decides how many bills, if any, to give to the person in room B and puts 
these bills in the envelope marked “Other person”. The person in room A then pockets the envelope 
marked “You”.   
 
When the person behind the screen has made his/her decision he/she puts the envelope marked “Other 
person” in the box marked “Mail”. The person then proceeds to a second screen and anonymously fills 
out a questionnaire about the experiment. The person puts the completed questionnaire in the box marked 
“Questionnaire” and leaves the room. That person is now finished with the study. 
 
In the meantime the people in the other room (room B) have been filling out a questionnaire. They do not 
know anything about these study instructions or that they have been paired with another person in another 
room, and they will not be told at any point during or after the study.  
 
You have been given a copy of the study instructions given to the people in room B (attached).  
 
When all the people in Room A have made their decisions, the experimenter takes the box marked “Mail” 
to an adjacent room. The experimenter records the contents of each envelope and adds the $5 dollar 
participation fee for the person in room B.  
 
The experimenter then takes the envelopes to Room B. The experimenter distributes the envelopes to the 
people in room B according to the pair numbers on their instructions. The people in room B then leave 
their room and the study is over.       30 
INSTRUCTIONS (“no information giving game/taking game”; room B) 
    
Thank you for participating in this study in which you will fill out a questionnaire.  
 
For your participation you will receive a payment of $5. After completing the questionnaire you may also 
receive some additional payment above and beyond the $5 participation fee.  
 
Both the questionnaire and these instructions are marked with your subject number.  
 
The questionnaires will be collected after 15 minutes. You will then receive an envelope with your 
payment for the study.   
 
The study is then over and you can leave the room.  
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TAKING GAME: INSTRUCTIONS (“no information”; room A)  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. You have all received a $5 show-up fee. You also have the 
opportunity to receive additional money as described below. 
 
Each of you will be paired with another person in another room based on your pair number. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are.  
 
You are in room A. The people in room B have NOT received these same instructions. A copy of the 
instructions they have received is attached. 
 
In this study we will play the taking game. 
 
The taking game works as follows. Every person in room A has been given two numbered envelopes 
together with these instructions (the number is written on the inside of the envelope, and is therefore 
invisible to others). One of these envelopes is marked “Other person” and contains ten $1 bills. The other 
envelope is marked “You” and is empty.  
 
The experimenter asks one person at a time in room A to go behind a screen where no one else can see 
what happens.    
 
Behind the screen, the person decides how many bills, if any, to take from the person in room B and puts 
these bills in the envelope marked “Other person”. The person in room A then pockets the envelope 
marked “You”.   
 
When the person behind the screen has made his/her decision he/she puts the envelope marked “Other 
person” in the box marked “Mail”. The person then proceeds to a second screen and anonymously fills 
out a questionnaire about the experiment. The person puts the completed questionnaire in the box marked 
“Questionnaire” and leaves the room. That person is now finished with the study. 
 
In the meantime the people in the other room (room B) have been filling out a questionnaire. They do not 
know anything about these study instructions or that they have been paired with another person in another 
room, and they will not be told at any point during or after the study.  
 
You have been given a copy of the study instructions given to the people in room B (attached).  
 
When all the people in Room A have made their decisions, the experimenter takes the box marked “Mail” 
to an adjacent room. The experimenter records the contents of each envelope and adds the $5 dollar 
participation fee for the person in room B.  
 
The experimenter then takes the envelopes to Room B. The experimenter distributes the envelopes to the 
people in room B according to the pair numbers on their instructions. The people in room B then leave 
their room and the study is over.     
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Appendix C: Instructions for Study 2 
 
INTRO FOR ALL GAMES 
 
Thank you for accepting this HIT. You have received $0.20 for participating. You also have the 
opportunity to receive additional money as described below. 
 
In this task, you will participate in a simple decision making study that lasts less than 2 minutes involving 
a very short (five question) survey. 
 
When you finish the survey, you will receive a completion code in order to get paid. 
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[Giving game + Transfer action instructions] 
 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with another person who also completes this HIT. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are. You cannot participate in 
this HIT more than once.  
 
You are an X (Y) person. All X and Y people have received these same instructions.  
 
In this HIT you will play the giving game. 
 
The giving game works as follows. Every X person starts with 100 cents. 
 
Each X person has been randomly paired with a Y person.  
 
The X person decides how much money out of the 100 cents, if any, to transfer to the Y person.  Once 
this is decided, the X person will fill out a short questionnaire and then the X person is finished with the 
HIT. The X person will receive as a bonus any money not transferred. 
 
Each Y person fills out the same questionnaire, and then is finished with the HIT. The Y person will 
receive as a bonus any money the X person transfers. 
 
The HIT is then over for both people. The X and Y players never interact again, and never have a 




You are an X player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you want to transfer to the Y player? 
 
Slider: 





You are a Y player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you think the X player will transfer to you? 
 
Slider: 
[ 0 ….. 100]   34 
[Keeping game + Transfer action instructions] 
 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with another person who also completes this HIT. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are. You cannot participate in 
this HIT more than once.  
 
You are an X (Y) person. All X and Y people have received these same instructions.  
 
In this HIT you will play the keeping game. 
 
The keeping game works as follows. Every X person starts with 100 cents. 
 
Each X person has been randomly paired with a Y person.  
 
The X person decides how much money out of the 100 cents, if any, to transfer to the Y person.  Once 
this is decided, the X person will fill out a short questionnaire and then the X person is finished with the 
HIT. The X person will receive as a bonus any money not transferred. 
 
Each Y person fills out the same questionnaire, and then is finished with the HIT. The Y person will 
receive as a bonus any money the X person transfers. 
 
The HIT is then over for both people. The X and Y players never interact again, and never have a 






You are an X player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you want to transfer to the Y player? 
 
Slider: 




You are a Y player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you think the X player will transfer to you? 
 
Slider: 
[ 0 ….. 100] 
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[Giving game + Give action instructions] 
 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with another person who also completes this HIT. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are. You cannot participate in 
this HIT more than once.  
 
You are an X (Y) person. All X and Y people have received these same instructions.  
 
In this HIT you will play the giving game. 
 
The giving game works as follows. Every X person starts with 100 cents. 
 
Each X person has been randomly paired with a Y person.  
 
The X person decides how much money out of the 100 cents, if any, to give to the Y person.  Once this is 
decided, the X person will fill out a short questionnaire and then the X person is finished with the HIT. 
The X person will receive as a bonus any money not given away. 
 
Each Y person fills out the same questionnaire, and then is finished with the HIT. The Y person will 
receive as a bonus any money the X person chooses to give. 
 
The HIT is then over for both people. The X and Y players never interact again, and never have a 




You are an X player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you want to give to the Y player? 
 
Slider: 




You are a Y player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you think the X player will give to you? 
 
Slider: 
[ 0 ….. 100]   36 
[Keeping game + Keep action instructions] 
 
 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with another person who also completes this HIT. You will 
never know who this other person is, and they will never know who you are. You cannot participate in 
this HIT more than once.  
 
You are an X (Y) person. All X and Y people have received these same instructions.  
 
In this HIT you will play the keeping game. 
 
The keeping game works as follows. Every X person starts with 100 cents. 
 
Each X person has been randomly paired with a Y person.  
 
The X person decides how much money out of the 100 cents, if any, to keep.  Once this is decided, the X 
person will fill out a short questionnaire and then the X person is finished with the HIT. The X person 
will receive as a bonus any money kept. 
 
Each Y person fills out the same questionnaire, and then is finished with the HIT. The Y person will 
receive as a bonus any money the X person does not keep. 
 
The HIT is then over for both people. The X and Y players never interact again, and never have a 





You are an X player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you want to keep for yourself? 
 
Slider: 




You are a Y player. How much money out of the 100 cents do you think the X player will keep? 
 
Slider: 
[ 0 ….. 100] 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ALL GAMES 
 
What is your gender? 
 
What is your age? 
 
Is English your first language? 
 
How many hours  a week would you estimate you spend doing on-line tasks for payment? 
 
What country do you live in? 
 
In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we 
are interested, in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect 
based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, 
please ignore the next question, and simple write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled “Any 
comments or questions?” Thank you very much. 
 
How difficult did you find this survey? 
 
Any comments or questions? 
 